The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE

Valentine Belfiglio

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE

Valentine Belfiglio

Published in Social Sciences (Volume 11, Issue 1)

Received: 25 December 2021 Accepted: 18 January 2022 Published: 28 January 2022

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Abstract

Thesis Statement: Alexander the Great’s grand strategy of world conquest and leaders who followed his example such as the Arabs of the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Adolf Hitler, could never achieve world conquest. The reason is that every offensive military operation ultimately reaches a culminating point. This principle applies to the leaders of modern countries today. Methodology: Historiography and conceptual analysis of the writings of ancient and modern scholars and historians. Results: Alexander’s desire for world conquest caused him to continually move from one victory to another without creating a new moral and political community coextensive with his conquests and capable to lending stability to a new empire. Conclusion and Implications: Alexander, and other previous or current leaders bent on world conquest can never achieve this goal because every offensive military campaign reaches a culminating point beyond which continued operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.

Published in	Social Sciences (Volume 11, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
Page(s)	1-4
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

World Conquest, Culminating Point, Offensive Military Operations

References

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[2]	Beaton, Roderick. 2021. The Greeks. New York: Basic Books: 181-216.
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[9]	Siculus, Diodorus, 2019. Phillip II, Alexander the Great, and the Successors. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 17. 17.
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[20]	Siculus, Diodorus, 2019. Phillip II, Alexander the Great, and the Successors. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 17.87.1. Diodorus reports that when Alexander was in Taxila, he brought his army back up to strength.
[21]	Arrian, 2012. The Campaigns of Alexander. Trans. Pamela Mensch. New York: Anchor Books: 5. 14-15.
[22]	Polybius, 1979. The Histories. trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York: Penguin: 15. 12.
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[29]	During the Monsoon Season from October to early December.
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[37]	Suetonius, Gaius. 1989 The Twelve Caesars, “Augustus,” Trans. Robert Graves. New York: Penguin Books: 18. 2.

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Valentine Belfiglio. (2022). The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE. Social Sciences, 11(1), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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Valentine Belfiglio. The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE. Soc. Sci. 2022, 11(1), 1-4. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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Valentine Belfiglio. The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE. Soc Sci. 2022;11(1):1-4. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11,
  author = {Valentine Belfiglio},
  title = {The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {11},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1-4},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20221101.11},
  abstract = {Thesis Statement: Alexander the Great’s grand strategy of world conquest and leaders who followed his example such as the Arabs of the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Adolf Hitler, could never achieve world conquest. The reason is that every offensive military operation ultimately reaches a culminating point. This principle applies to the leaders of modern countries today. Methodology: Historiography and conceptual analysis of the writings of ancient and modern scholars and historians. Results: Alexander’s desire for world conquest caused him to continually move from one victory to another without creating a new moral and political community coextensive with his conquests and capable to lending stability to a new empire. Conclusion and Implications: Alexander, and other previous or current leaders bent on world conquest can never achieve this goal because every offensive military campaign reaches a culminating point beyond which continued operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.},
 year = {2022}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE
AU  - Valentine Belfiglio
Y1  - 2022/01/28
PY  - 2022
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
T2  - Social Sciences
JF  - Social Sciences
JO  - Social Sciences
SP  - 1
EP  - 4
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-988X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
AB  - Thesis Statement: Alexander the Great’s grand strategy of world conquest and leaders who followed his example such as the Arabs of the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Adolf Hitler, could never achieve world conquest. The reason is that every offensive military operation ultimately reaches a culminating point. This principle applies to the leaders of modern countries today. Methodology: Historiography and conceptual analysis of the writings of ancient and modern scholars and historians. Results: Alexander’s desire for world conquest caused him to continually move from one victory to another without creating a new moral and political community coextensive with his conquests and capable to lending stability to a new empire. Conclusion and Implications: Alexander, and other previous or current leaders bent on world conquest can never achieve this goal because every offensive military campaign reaches a culminating point beyond which continued operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.
VL  - 11
IS  - 1
ER  -

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Author Information

Valentine Belfiglio

Department of Social Sciences and Historical Studies, Texas Woman’s University, City of Denton, the United States

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Valentine Belfiglio. (2022). The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE. Social Sciences, 11(1), 1-4. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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ACS Style

Valentine Belfiglio. The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE. Soc. Sci. 2022, 11(1), 1-4. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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AMA Style

Valentine Belfiglio. The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE. Soc Sci. 2022;11(1):1-4. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11,
  author = {Valentine Belfiglio},
  title = {The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {11},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1-4},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20221101.11},
  abstract = {Thesis Statement: Alexander the Great’s grand strategy of world conquest and leaders who followed his example such as the Arabs of the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Adolf Hitler, could never achieve world conquest. The reason is that every offensive military operation ultimately reaches a culminating point. This principle applies to the leaders of modern countries today. Methodology: Historiography and conceptual analysis of the writings of ancient and modern scholars and historians. Results: Alexander’s desire for world conquest caused him to continually move from one victory to another without creating a new moral and political community coextensive with his conquests and capable to lending stability to a new empire. Conclusion and Implications: Alexander, and other previous or current leaders bent on world conquest can never achieve this goal because every offensive military campaign reaches a culminating point beyond which continued operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.},
 year = {2022}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Battle of Hydaspes: Alexander’s Culminating Point: 326 BCE
AU  - Valentine Belfiglio
Y1  - 2022/01/28
PY  - 2022
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
T2  - Social Sciences
JF  - Social Sciences
JO  - Social Sciences
SP  - 1
EP  - 4
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-988X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20221101.11
AB  - Thesis Statement: Alexander the Great’s grand strategy of world conquest and leaders who followed his example such as the Arabs of the seventh and eighth centuries, Napoleon I, and Adolf Hitler, could never achieve world conquest. The reason is that every offensive military operation ultimately reaches a culminating point. This principle applies to the leaders of modern countries today. Methodology: Historiography and conceptual analysis of the writings of ancient and modern scholars and historians. Results: Alexander’s desire for world conquest caused him to continually move from one victory to another without creating a new moral and political community coextensive with his conquests and capable to lending stability to a new empire. Conclusion and Implications: Alexander, and other previous or current leaders bent on world conquest can never achieve this goal because every offensive military campaign reaches a culminating point beyond which continued operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.
VL  - 11
IS  - 1
ER  -

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