This article examines how the economic liberalisation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region created a ripe climate for crony capitalism. The incomplete character of the neoliberal program that was encouraged by Western governments and international financial institutions in the 1990s resulted in selective liberalisation and allowed for the tightening of state-business relations. The implementation of the liberal economic agenda facilitated the takeover of state resources and privileged access to the domestic market by dominant political-economic coalitions and produced a novel regime whereby hopes of a plural political system and a de-regulated free market were replaced with a version of Arab ‘crony capitalism’. The evolvement of this phenomenon is analysed and explained by appealing to the example of economic reforms that took place in Egypt and Tunisia, two countries which, between the 1990s and 2010s, were hailed as success stories of the neoliberal reforms in the Arab World. Although the façade of the countries' respective economies became apparent as de-regulated, new reforms became a powerful instrument for the foundation of a novel network of preferential beneficiaries leading to the reshuffling of alliances among the country's major players. The overarching argument of this paper is that liberalisation efforts in Egypt in Tunisia, rather than eradicating distributional coalitions, have merely rearranged them by reshuffling the existing alliance among the countries' major players.
Published in | Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 5, Issue 4) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15 |
Page(s) | 127-132 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Neoliberal Reform, Economic Liberalization, Crony Capitalism, International Monetary Fund
[1] | Abul-Magd, Z. (2011). The army and the economy in Egypt - Egypt Independent. [online] Egypt Independent. Available at: https://ww.egyptindependent.com/army-and-economy-egypt/ [Accessed 27 Apr. 2019]. |
[2] | Adly, A. (2011) ‘Mubarak (1990-2011): The State of Corruption’, Arab Reform Initiative Thematic Studies- The Poltics of Corruption. Available online: http://arab-reform.net/sites /default/files/Mubarak_1990_19902011_The_State_of_Corruption.pdf (Accessed 18 April 2019). |
[3] | Armbrust, W. (2012). ‘The Revolution Against Neoliberalism’ in B. Haddad, R. Bsheer and Z. Abu-Rish. eds. The Down of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? London: Pluto. |
[4] | Bush, R. (2011). ‘Coalition for Dispossession and Networks of Resistance? Land Politics and Agrarian Reform in Egypt. Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 38 (3), pp. 391-405. |
[5] | Cassarino, J. P. (1999). ‘The EU- Tunisian association agreement and Tunisia’s structural reform program’. Middle East Journal. 53 (1), pp. 59-74. |
[6] | Chekir, H. and Diwan, I. (2012). Crony Capitalism in Egypt. Working Papers Center for International Development at Harvard University. CID Working Paper No. 250. Available at: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/250_Diwan_EGX+paper.pdf (Accessed: 25 April 2019). |
[7] | Chomiak, L. and Entelis, J. P. (2011) The making of North Africa’s Intifada, Middle East Report, 259. Pp. 8-15. |
[8] | Cook, S. A. (2012) The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahir Square. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. |
[9] | Dillman, B. (2001). ‘Facing the Market in North Africa’, Middle East Journal. 55 (2), pp. 198-215. |
[10] | Diwan, I., Keefer, P., Schiffbauer, M. (2013). ‘The Effect of Cronyism on Private Sector Growth in Egypt’. Preliminary draft 2013. Preliminary draft. |
[11] | Eibl, F. and Malik, A. (2016). ‘The Politics of Partial Liberalization: Cronyism and Non-Tarrif Protection in Mubarak’s Egypt.’ CSAE Working Paper WPS/2016-27, Oxford. |
[12] | Hakimian, H. and Moshaver, Z. (2001). The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of transition in the Middle East. Richmond: Curzon. |
[13] | Hashim, A. (2011). ‘The Egyptian Military, Part Two: From Mubarak Onward’. Middle East Policy. 18 (4), pp. 106-126. |
[14] | Henry, M. C. and Springbord, R. (2010) Globalisation and the Politics of Development in the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
[15] | Hinnebusch, R. (1985) Egyptian Politics Under Sadat. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
[16] | Kaboub, F. (2013). ‘The Making of the Tunisian Revolution’. Middle East Development Journal. 5 (1), pp. 1-21. |
[17] | Kadir, A. Y. and Wilson Sokhey, S. (2012) ‘Economic Liberalisation and Political Moderation. The Case of Anti-System Parties’. Party Politics. 19 (2), pp. 230-255. |
[18] | Keefer, P., Diwan, I. and Schiffbauer, M. (2015). Pyramid Capitalism: Cronyism, Regulation, and Firm Productivity in Egypt. Working Papers Center for International Development at Harvard University. Working Paper No. 291. Available at: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cid/files/publications/faculty-working-papers/Cronyism_Egypt_Diwan_CID291.pdf (Accessed 22 April 2019) |
[19] | Khiari, S. and Lamloum, O. (1999). Tunisie: des élections en trope-l’oeil. Politique Africaine, 74 (4), pp. 106-115. |
[20] | King, S. (2007). ‘Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. Political Science Quarterly, 122 (3), pp. 433-459. |
[21] | King, S. (2009). The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). |
[22] | Lipset, S. M. (1950). ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, The American Political Science Review, 53 (1), pp. 69-105. |
[23] | Loewe, M (2013). ‘Industrial Policy in Egypt 2004-2011.’ DIE Discussion Paper 13/2013, Deutsches Institut fuer Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn. |
[24] | Marco, R. D., Lanzoni, E. and Rubini, L. (2001). ‘Support to SMEs in the Arab Region: The Case of Tunisia’, UNIDO/UNDP, pp. 3-111. |
[25] | Marshall, S, Sttacher, J. (2012). ‘Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital’ Middle East Report (Spring 2012). |
[26] | Momami, B. (2005). ‘IMF-Egyptian Debt Negotiations’, Cairo Papers in Social Science. 26 (3). The American University in Cario Press: Cairo, p. 65. |
[27] | Murphy, E. (1999) Economic and Political Change in Tunisia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. |
[28] | Nashashibi, K., Elhage, M. and Fedelino, A. (2001) ‘Financial Liberalization in Arab Countries’ in Macroeconomic Issues and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa. ed. Z. Iqbal. Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund. |
[29] | North, D. (1997) ‘The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problem’, WIDER Annual Lectures, 1 (March 1997), UNU (United Nations University)/WIDER (World Institute for Developing Economics Research). |
[30] | O’Donnel, G., Schmitter, P. C. and Whitehead, L. (1986) Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives’. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. |
[31] | Okar, E. L. (2005) ‘Opposition and Economic Crises’ in Authoritarianism in the Middle East Regimes and Resistance. ed. M. P. Posusney and M. P. Angrist. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. |
[32] | Owen, R. (2004) State, Power and Politics in the Middle East. London: Routledge. |
[33] | Payne, R. (1993). ‘Economic Crisis and Policy Reform in the 1980s’ in Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa, ed. W. M. Habeeb and I. W. Zartman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview). |
[34] | Rijkers, B., Freund, C., Nucifora, A (2014). ‘All in the Family: State Capture in Tunisia’. No. 122, World Bank, Washington DC. |
[35] | Rodrik, D. (2008). ‘Industrial Policy: Don’t Ask Why, Ask How. Middle East Development Journal. 23 (1), pp. 1-29. |
[36] | Said, A. (2012) ‘The Paradox of Transition to ‘Democracy’ under Military Rule.’ Social Research. 79 (2), pp. 397-43. |
[37] | Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Penguin Books. |
[38] | Schlumberger, O. (2005) Economic Reform and Economic Order in the Arab World. University of Tubingen. |
[39] | Sfakiankis, J. (2004). The Whale of the Nile: Networks, Businessmen and Bureaucrats during the Era of Privatization in Egypt. In Networks of Privilege: Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East. ed. Heydemann, S. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. |
[40] | Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1994). ‘Politicians and Firms’ Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109 (4), pp. 995-1025. |
[41] | Springborg, R. (1989) Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of a Political Order. Boulder, CO: Westview. |
[42] | Tsourapas (2013). ‘The Other Side of a Neoliberal Miracle: Economic Reform and Political De-Liberalization in Ben Ali’s Tunisia. Mediterranean Politics. 18 (1), pp. 23-41. |
[43] | Van de Walle, N. (2001) African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
[44] | Vitalis, R. and Heydemann, S. (2000). ‘War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism: Explaining State-Market Relations in the Postwar Middle East’ in War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East. S. Heydemann, ed. Berkeley, California: University of California Press. |
[45] | Waterbury, J. (1989). ‘The Political Management of Economic Adjustment and Reform’ in Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment ed. J. Nelson. Washington DC.: Overseas Development Council, pp. 39-55. |
[46] | Williamson, J. (1990). What Washington Means by Policy Reform’, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington: Institute for International Economics). |
[47] | Williamson, J. (2009). ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’. Law and Business. 15 (7), pp. 7-21. |
[48] | World Bank (1995), Republic of Tunisia: Growth Policies and Poverty Allevation (Washington DC: World Bank). |
APA Style
Natalia Gierowska. (2022). Liberal Economic Reforms and the Rise of Crony Capitalism in the MENA Region. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 5(4), 127-132. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15
ACS Style
Natalia Gierowska. Liberal Economic Reforms and the Rise of Crony Capitalism in the MENA Region. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2022, 5(4), 127-132. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15
AMA Style
Natalia Gierowska. Liberal Economic Reforms and the Rise of Crony Capitalism in the MENA Region. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2022;5(4):127-132. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15
@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15, author = {Natalia Gierowska}, title = {Liberal Economic Reforms and the Rise of Crony Capitalism in the MENA Region}, journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {127-132}, doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20220504.15}, abstract = {This article examines how the economic liberalisation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region created a ripe climate for crony capitalism. The incomplete character of the neoliberal program that was encouraged by Western governments and international financial institutions in the 1990s resulted in selective liberalisation and allowed for the tightening of state-business relations. The implementation of the liberal economic agenda facilitated the takeover of state resources and privileged access to the domestic market by dominant political-economic coalitions and produced a novel regime whereby hopes of a plural political system and a de-regulated free market were replaced with a version of Arab ‘crony capitalism’. The evolvement of this phenomenon is analysed and explained by appealing to the example of economic reforms that took place in Egypt and Tunisia, two countries which, between the 1990s and 2010s, were hailed as success stories of the neoliberal reforms in the Arab World. Although the façade of the countries' respective economies became apparent as de-regulated, new reforms became a powerful instrument for the foundation of a novel network of preferential beneficiaries leading to the reshuffling of alliances among the country's major players. The overarching argument of this paper is that liberalisation efforts in Egypt in Tunisia, rather than eradicating distributional coalitions, have merely rearranged them by reshuffling the existing alliance among the countries' major players.}, year = {2022} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Liberal Economic Reforms and the Rise of Crony Capitalism in the MENA Region AU - Natalia Gierowska Y1 - 2022/12/08 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15 DO - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15 T2 - Journal of Political Science and International Relations JF - Journal of Political Science and International Relations JO - Journal of Political Science and International Relations SP - 127 EP - 132 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2640-2785 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20220504.15 AB - This article examines how the economic liberalisation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region created a ripe climate for crony capitalism. The incomplete character of the neoliberal program that was encouraged by Western governments and international financial institutions in the 1990s resulted in selective liberalisation and allowed for the tightening of state-business relations. The implementation of the liberal economic agenda facilitated the takeover of state resources and privileged access to the domestic market by dominant political-economic coalitions and produced a novel regime whereby hopes of a plural political system and a de-regulated free market were replaced with a version of Arab ‘crony capitalism’. The evolvement of this phenomenon is analysed and explained by appealing to the example of economic reforms that took place in Egypt and Tunisia, two countries which, between the 1990s and 2010s, were hailed as success stories of the neoliberal reforms in the Arab World. Although the façade of the countries' respective economies became apparent as de-regulated, new reforms became a powerful instrument for the foundation of a novel network of preferential beneficiaries leading to the reshuffling of alliances among the country's major players. The overarching argument of this paper is that liberalisation efforts in Egypt in Tunisia, rather than eradicating distributional coalitions, have merely rearranged them by reshuffling the existing alliance among the countries' major players. VL - 5 IS - 4 ER -