Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence

Tarja Cronberg

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence

Tarja Cronberg

Published in Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 4, Issue 3)

Received: 25 May 2021 Accepted: 16 August 2021 Published: 31 August 2021

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Abstract

Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.

Published in	Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 4, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15
Page(s)	102-111
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

NPT, Deterrence, Calculated Ambiguity, Negative Security Guarantees, NWFZ-states, Mexican Amendments, Nuclear-free Status, Nuclear Weapon-free World

References

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Tarja Cronberg. (2021). Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(3), 102-111. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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Tarja Cronberg. Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2021, 4(3), 102-111. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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AMA Style

Tarja Cronberg. Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2021;4(3):102-111. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15,
  author = {Tarja Cronberg},
  title = {Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {102-111},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20210403.15},
  abstract = {Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.},
 year = {2021}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence
AU  - Tarja Cronberg
Y1  - 2021/08/31
PY  - 2021
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T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 102
EP  - 111
PB  - Science Publishing Group
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AB  - Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Tarja Cronberg

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden

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APA Style

Tarja Cronberg. (2021). Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(3), 102-111. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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ACS Style

Tarja Cronberg. Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2021, 4(3), 102-111. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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AMA Style

Tarja Cronberg. Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2021;4(3):102-111. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15

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@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15,
  author = {Tarja Cronberg},
  title = {Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {102-111},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20210403.15},
  abstract = {Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Zero Calculated Ambiguity: Unconditional Security Assurances for NWFZ-States Limit the Space for Deterrence
AU  - Tarja Cronberg
Y1  - 2021/08/31
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 102
EP  - 111
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.15
AB  - Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In “Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach” I have applied the “sociology of technology” in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the “Mexican amendments” from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
ER  -

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