Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel

Amnon Sofrin

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

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Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel

Amnon Sofrin

Published in Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 4, Issue 3)

Received: 23 August 2021 Accepted: 4 September 2021 Published: 11 September 2021

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Abstract

Israel is fighting terrorism from its very early days. The terror acts are characterized by carrying out lethal attack on Israeli residents and/ or the abduction of civilians / soldiers in order to free Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail. During the years Israel's counterinsurgency doctrine was shaped based on two main cornerstones – Moshe Dayan’s doctrine of reprisal actions on terror attacks, formulated in the early 1950s, and the "Rabin Doctrine" on dealing with abducted Israelis. This article will analyze the processes of decision- making in Israel when fighting the two main forms of terror acts. After reviewing the main decision – making model a new decision- making model will be presented - the Two-Group Decision Making Model that will be demonstrated through analysis of four case studies: two cases of terror attack that Israel reacted by a military reprisal operation and two cases in which Israelis were abducted and the decision- makers had to choose to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation. The main conclusions of this article are that most of the decision- making process is made within a very small and intimate group headed by the leader and in most cases the Israeli decision – makers prefer to carry out a military operation on negotiations or any other course of action.

Published in	Journal of Political Science and International Relations (Volume 4, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
Page(s)	112-124
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Counterinsurgency, Israel, Rescue Operations, Reprisal Actions, Decision Making

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Amnon Sofrin. (2021). Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(3), 112-124. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

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Amnon Sofrin. Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2021, 4(3), 112-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

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Amnon Sofrin. Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2021;4(3):112-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

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@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16,
  author = {Amnon Sofrin},
  title = {Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {112-124},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20210403.16},
  abstract = {Israel is fighting terrorism from its very early days. The terror acts are characterized by carrying out lethal attack on Israeli residents and/ or the abduction of civilians / soldiers in order to free Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail. During the years Israel's counterinsurgency doctrine was shaped based on two main cornerstones – Moshe Dayan’s doctrine of reprisal actions on terror attacks, formulated in the early 1950s, and the "Rabin Doctrine" on dealing with abducted Israelis. This article will analyze the processes of decision- making in Israel when fighting the two main forms of terror acts. After reviewing the main decision – making model a new decision- making model will be presented - the Two-Group Decision Making Model that will be demonstrated through analysis of four case studies: two cases of terror attack that Israel reacted by a military reprisal operation and two cases in which Israelis were abducted and the decision- makers had to choose to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation. The main conclusions of this article are that most of the decision- making process is made within a very small and intimate group headed by the leader and in most cases the Israeli decision – makers prefer to carry out a military operation on negotiations or any other course of action.},
 year = {2021}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel
AU  - Amnon Sofrin
Y1  - 2021/09/11
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 112
EP  - 124
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
AB  - Israel is fighting terrorism from its very early days. The terror acts are characterized by carrying out lethal attack on Israeli residents and/ or the abduction of civilians / soldiers in order to free Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail. During the years Israel's counterinsurgency doctrine was shaped based on two main cornerstones – Moshe Dayan’s doctrine of reprisal actions on terror attacks, formulated in the early 1950s, and the "Rabin Doctrine" on dealing with abducted Israelis. This article will analyze the processes of decision- making in Israel when fighting the two main forms of terror acts. After reviewing the main decision – making model a new decision- making model will be presented - the Two-Group Decision Making Model that will be demonstrated through analysis of four case studies: two cases of terror attack that Israel reacted by a military reprisal operation and two cases in which Israelis were abducted and the decision- makers had to choose to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation. The main conclusions of this article are that most of the decision- making process is made within a very small and intimate group headed by the leader and in most cases the Israeli decision – makers prefer to carry out a military operation on negotiations or any other course of action.
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Amnon Sofrin

Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

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Amnon Sofrin. (2021). Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel. Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(3), 112-124. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

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Amnon Sofrin. Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel. J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relat. 2021, 4(3), 112-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

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Amnon Sofrin. Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel. J Polit Sci Int Relat. 2021;4(3):112-124. doi: 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16,
  author = {Amnon Sofrin},
  title = {Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel},
  journal = {Journal of Political Science and International Relations},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {112-124},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jpsir.20210403.16},
  abstract = {Israel is fighting terrorism from its very early days. The terror acts are characterized by carrying out lethal attack on Israeli residents and/ or the abduction of civilians / soldiers in order to free Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail. During the years Israel's counterinsurgency doctrine was shaped based on two main cornerstones – Moshe Dayan’s doctrine of reprisal actions on terror attacks, formulated in the early 1950s, and the "Rabin Doctrine" on dealing with abducted Israelis. This article will analyze the processes of decision- making in Israel when fighting the two main forms of terror acts. After reviewing the main decision – making model a new decision- making model will be presented - the Two-Group Decision Making Model that will be demonstrated through analysis of four case studies: two cases of terror attack that Israel reacted by a military reprisal operation and two cases in which Israelis were abducted and the decision- makers had to choose to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation. The main conclusions of this article are that most of the decision- making process is made within a very small and intimate group headed by the leader and in most cases the Israeli decision – makers prefer to carry out a military operation on negotiations or any other course of action.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Decision Making Processes in Counter-Terrorism Operations in Israel
AU  - Amnon Sofrin
Y1  - 2021/09/11
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
DO  - 10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
T2  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JF  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
JO  - Journal of Political Science and International Relations
SP  - 112
EP  - 124
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2785
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210403.16
AB  - Israel is fighting terrorism from its very early days. The terror acts are characterized by carrying out lethal attack on Israeli residents and/ or the abduction of civilians / soldiers in order to free Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail. During the years Israel's counterinsurgency doctrine was shaped based on two main cornerstones – Moshe Dayan’s doctrine of reprisal actions on terror attacks, formulated in the early 1950s, and the "Rabin Doctrine" on dealing with abducted Israelis. This article will analyze the processes of decision- making in Israel when fighting the two main forms of terror acts. After reviewing the main decision – making model a new decision- making model will be presented - the Two-Group Decision Making Model that will be demonstrated through analysis of four case studies: two cases of terror attack that Israel reacted by a military reprisal operation and two cases in which Israelis were abducted and the decision- makers had to choose to surrender to the terrorists demands or to launch a military rescue operation. The main conclusions of this article are that most of the decision- making process is made within a very small and intimate group headed by the leader and in most cases the Israeli decision – makers prefer to carry out a military operation on negotiations or any other course of action.
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download